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Abstract
Science and mathematics are currently under-
represented in the computational creativity (CC)
community. We discuss why the CC community
should apply their work to mathematical and scientific
domains, and argue that this would be mutually
beneficial for the domains in question. We identify a
key challenge in Automated Reasoning – that it has not
achieved widespread adoption by mathematicians; and
one in Automated Scientific Discovery – the need for
communicability of automatically generated scientific
knowledge. We recommend that CC researchers help to
address these two challenges by: (i) applying systems
based on cognitive mechanisms to scientific and mathe-
matical domains; (ii) employing experience in building
and evaluating interactive systems to this context;
and (iii) using expertise in automatically producing
framing functionality to enhance the communicability
of automatically generated scientific knowledge.
Introduction
Despite the best efforts of successive ICCC organising com-
mittees and the computational creativity (CC) community,
CC has always attracted substantially more interest from
researchers in artistic than scientific and mathematical do-
mains. In their 2017 study of application domains in CC,
(Loughran and O’Neill 2017) found that, of 16 categories,
papers on Maths, Science and Logic accounted for only 3%
of the 353 papers on CC across 12 years. Of course, some
work is domain independent, or at least not easily assigned
to an academic discipline, such as the body of work on CC
and curiosity (for instance (Grace et al. 2017b)). Even tak-
ing this into account, it is clear that science and mathematics
are vastly under-represented in our community.
There are many reasons why this may be the case. Firstly,
AI researchers in scientific domains may well be doing
creativity-related work in other contexts but not engaging
with the CC community. Automated reasoning (usually de-
ductive reasoning in mathematics) and automated scientific
discovery (usually inductive reasoning in a scientific do-
main) are both thriving subfields of AI, with internationally
recognised journals as outlets for publication and engage-
ment; certainly these will contain work relevant to our field
but couched in different terminology with different method-
ologies. Secondly, other priorities in scientific domains may
have led to a focus on techniques such as search, data-
mining and automated deduction. Since these generate re-
sults of interest to domain experts, the more difficult, fluid
and tenuous concept of creativity may be seen as unneces-
sary, risky or simply not a priority. This may particularly
be the case given the various “AI winters” in the twentieth
century (the second of which ended in 1993, just six years
before the first workshop on CC), and the need for AI to
“prove itself” (Crevier 1993). Thirdly, it may be easier to
be a hobbyist game designer or artist or composer (many
CC researchers are deeply involved in the domains in which
they work), than an AI researcher and also an occasional
physicist. Fourthly, CC researchers may consider that even
if generation is possible within scientific domains, evalua-
tion is too difficult. How we should evaluate our work and
our systems has always been a contentious, albeit impor-
tant, issue in CC, with few proposed evaluation metrics and
the majority of researchers still arguing for value along the
lines of “we/people liked the system’s output” or “we/people
couldn’t distinguish the system’s output from human pro-
duced work” (Jordanous 2014). It might be the case that in
science, the main evaluation metric – “is it true?”, or “does
it work?” – is considered simply too expensive or difficult to
demonstrate. Even if evaluation is possible, we may be more
prone to dismissing initial results as uninteresting in science
than in artistic domains. For instance, we may get a greater
sense of progress from a system working in game design
which outputs a new (rather basic) game, than one working
in geology which outputs a new (rather basic) result.
In this position paper we argue that neglecting scientific
and mathematics domains in CC is at best a wasted oppor-
tunity, and at worst a significant problem for the field. Deep
learning and ML are making inroads everywhere: genera-
tive arts, processors, Go, machine vision, and so on, and we
need to consider as a community where this leaves us. We
believe that it is essential to the health of our field that we
reach out as a community at this stage, both to domain ex-
perts in science and mathematics and to those in related AI
areas. The benefits of doing so will go both ways: we argue
that research in CC can help to address key challenges in
both Automated Reasoning and Automated Scientific Dis-
covery. As AI is used more and more in science, there is
greater dependence on blackbox machine learning systems.
While providing greater predictive power, this often comes
at the cost of understanding. We call this the Understand-
ability Problem and argue that it will become a big issue
in science, which we will have to address. Twenty years of
thinking about computational creativity has provided us with
valuable tools for addressing these problems. This paper is a
call to arms to CC researchers to apply their work to science
and mathematics.
A deeper look at the 3% of papers in Maths, Science
and Logic (including, for instance, (Juršič et al. 2012;
O’Donoghue et al. 2015)) is outwith the scope of this paper.
Similarly, we leave aside the question of what creativity or
non-creativity looks like in the arts or sciences; for now we
simply assume that creative endeavours take place in both
domains.
Loughran and O’Neill argue that “tackling scientific, log-
ical or realistic issues could help bring the reputation of CC
away from a purely aesthetic domain towards developing so-
lutions for real world problems.” (Loughran and O’Neill
2017, p. 7) and that “It is imperative that the field remains
balanced as it grows and that we remember to reflect on
all areas of growth.” (Ibid.). In this paper we support and
present further arguments for this position, alongside practi-
cal recommendations for doing so.
What are the sciences and arts?
The concept of science is not a straightforward one. The
division of the origins of learning and systematic produc-
tion of new knowledge into disciplines as we know them
tends to takes into account at least some of the following:
methodologies, objects of study (which can be shared with
other disciplines), a body of accumulated knowledge (which
is generally not shared with other disciplines), theories and
concepts, terminology and an institutional manifesto (so that
it can reproduce itself) (Krishnan 2009, p. 9). Sciences in-
clude Natural sciences, which are subdivided into physical
sciences (chemistry, physics, astronomy), life sciences, or
biology (zoology, botany, ecology, genetics) and earth sci-
ence (geology, oceanography, meteorology, palaeontology);
Social sciences (psychology, sociology, economics, law, po-
litical science); Formal sciences (mathematics, logic, theo-
retical computer science, statistics); and Applied sciences,
which are subdivided into engineering (computer science,
civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engi-
neering); health sciences (medicine, dentistry, pharmacy)
and agriculture. The number and variety of sciences makes
generalisations difficult, and core values vary accordingly.
However, values commonly associated with the (rather un-
helpfully named) “hard sciences” include repeatability, re-
producibility, predictability, generality and understandabil-
ity. This last value is particularly cherished: for instance,
Roger G. Newton sums it up as “The primary aim of most
physical scientists is to understand and explain the workings
of Nature.” (Newton 2000, p. 4).
The arts are possibly even harder to define. Indeed, Gallie
specifically uses “Art” as an example of an essentially con-
tested concept. This is a concept, the definition of which is
“not resolvable by argument of any kind” (Gallie 1955 1956,








Table 1: Possible perspectives on scientific and artistic en-
deavours.
States Congressional policy on arts education, provides the
following extensional definition:
The term ‘the arts’ includes, but is not limited to, mu-
sic (instrumental and vocal), dance, drama, folk art,
creative writing, architecture and allied fields, paint-
ing, sculpture, photography, graphic and craft arts, in-
dustrial design, costume and fashion design, motion
pictures, television, radio, film, video, tape and sound
recording, the arts related to the presentation, perfor-
mance, execution, and exhibition of such major art
forms, all those traditional arts practiced by the diverse
peoples of this country. (sic) and the study and appli-
cation of the arts to the human environment.1
As a starting point, we could suggest (generalising, con-
troversially) some of the differences between the sciences
and the arts as shown in Table 1. In particular, the termi-
nological difference between discovering and creating may
explain our field’s current focus on the arts. Of course,
the real-world everyday lived experience of doing science
or doing art is far more complex than Table 1 would sug-
gest. Studies of interpretations of seismic data in geology,
for instance, show the large number of different expert in-
terpretations of the same seismic section, highlighting the
subjectivity involved (Bond et al. 2007). These interpreta-
tions are used to analyse subsurface geology, and form the
basis for many exploration and extraction decisions. Even in
cases where interpreters report that an interpretation is rel-
atively straightforward, there are significant differences in
interpretation, leading to significantly different predictions,
for instance about gross pore volume or gross rock volume
(Rankey 2003). While objectivity may be the goal here,
such studies suggest that this aspect of geological practice
is closer to visual art interpretation than it is to some other
scientific domains.
Similarly, studies of the backstage production of math-
ematics show that beauty is often a guiding value (Inglis
and Aberdein 2015); there is a high level of disagreement
amongst experts about the validity of certain proofs (Inglis
et al. 2013); and proofs and theories are often considered
to be socially constructed rather than discovered (Lakatos
1976). Less structured knowledge such as our ability to rea-
son logically has been shown to be highly context depen-
dent (for instance, participants in the Wason Selection Task
were unable to solve a logical problem at an abstract level
1http://web.csulb.edu/ jvancamp/361 r8.html
but could solve it correctly when it was framed in a familiar
context (Wason and Shapiro 1971)); constructing ground-
ing metaphors to the physical world and abstract linking
metaphors argued to be fundamental to our understanding
and construction of mathematical knowledge (Lakoff and
Núñez 2000); and even the language in which reasoning oc-
curs affecting our preconceptions, perceptions and assump-
tions (Barton 2009). An analogous story could be told in the
arts; for instance, in some contexts paintings are criticised
for being beautiful, with the goal being truth, or knowledge
(Derrida 1987).
Dibbets expresses the relationship between arts and sci-
ences as follows:
But in the end, we all do very much of the same. All
scientists, artists, composers and writers are intensively
occupied imagining something that does not yet exist.
They find themselves at the borders of areas where up
to then hardly anyone found himself, trying to solve
problems that are incomprehensible to others, trying to
answer questions no one has ever asked. Here, they
share a vision on things that are not yet real. (Dibbets
2002, p. 1)
Some of these interdisciplinary features are recognised in
curriculum design and teaching featuring transferable skills,
in which one skill may be learned within a scientific con-
text and developed or employed in an arts context, or vice
versa (see for instance (Gaff and Ratcliff 1996)). Of course,
the need for so many interdisciplinary initiatives (and related
concepts such as transdisciplinarity, pluridisciplinarity, and
multidisciplinarity) may suggest that some traditional disci-
pline boundaries are no longer drawn in a helpful way. The
evolving role and functionality of AI systems further com-
plicates things. The focus of AI researchers, particularly in
machine learning, is often on the skills they hope to simu-
late rather than a particular domain in which they are usually
employed. This may be a more productive approach than the
typical CC focus on domain over skill.
Automated Reasoning
Brief history
Automated Reasoning (AR) is a flourishing academic and
industry community, with a range of publication venues, in-
cluding the Journal of Automated Reasoning, the Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR)
and Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE). It has
a relatively long history in Artificial Intelligence research:
experiments were conducted as early as 1955, with Newell,
Shaw and Simons Logic Theorist, which searched forward
from axioms to look for proofs of results. Theorem provers
HOL, NuPrl and Nqthm, and a variety of other approaches
and software tools were in development in the mid-1980’s
for practical reasoning about programs: (Jones 2003) gives
an account of the early history of AR. Notable recent suc-
cesses include Tom Hales and his team’s formalisation of
their proof of the Kepler conjecture, using several theorem
provers to confirm Hales’ major 1998 paper (Hales et al.
2010); and Georges Gonthier and team’s 2012 formalisation
of the 255 page odd-order theorem (Gonthier 2013) (one of
the most important and longest proofs of 20th century alge-
bra) in the Coq theorem prover.
Key Challenge
While the simulation of mathematical reasoning has been
a driving force throughout the history of AI, it has not
achieved widespread adoption by mathematicians. This is
now seen as one of the key challenges in the field. The 2017
and 2019 Big Proof I and II Programmes2 included under
the Programme Theme description:
The programme is directed at the challenges of bring-
ing proof technology into mainstream mathematical
practice.3
and
The scale and sophistication of proof technology is ap-
proaching a point where it can effectively aid human
mathematical creativity at all levels of expertise. (Ibid.)
We can hypothesise many reasons as to why there re-
mains a disconnect between automated and human reason-
ing. There may be cultural reasons: mathematicians are
typically not trained to use Automated Theorem Provers
(ATPs), it is not usually part of the undergraduate course or
subsequent training and practice. It may simply be the case
that perhaps mathematicians that use AR become known as
computer scientists (definitions of both of these professions
are fluid and somewhat overlapping). Lastly – and this oft-
cited reason is our focus here – it may be because current
systems cannot do mathematics in the ways that humans do:
machine proofs are often considered by mathematicians to
be unclear, uninspiring and untrustworthy, as opposed to hu-
man proofs which can be deep, elegant and explanatory.
Opportunities for CC
Traditionally there have been two barriers to developing sys-
tems which produce “human-like” mathematics: firstly, it is
difficult to know what this is; and secondly, it is difficult to
automate (Bundy 2011; Gowers 2000). The growing inter-
disciplinary study of mathematical practice, started by Polya
(Polya 1945) and Lakatos (Lakatos 1976), can shed light on
the first of these problems. They were early advocates of the
(as yet unarticulated) view that it is fruitful to look at what
Hersh later termed “backstage mathematics” – the informal
workings and conversations about “mathematics in the mak-
ing” (as opposed to “frontstage mathematics” – textbook
or publication-style “finished mathematics”) (Hersh 1991).
This rapidly growing body of work is interdisciplinary to
varying degrees, bridging mathematics, history, sociology,
philosophy, education and cognitive science of mathemat-
ics.
2These were hosted at the Isaac Newton Institute
(INI) for Mathematical Sciences (2017) and, as a fol-
low on INI satellite event (2019) at the International
Centre for Mathematical Sciences in Edinburgh, and or-
ganised by some of the most influential people in auto-
mated reasoning today: https://www.newton.ac.uk/event/bpr,
https://www.newton.ac.uk/event/bprw02
3https://www.newton.ac.uk/event/bpr
Automated Reasoning is largely based on the traditional
model of mathematics as a solitary, logic-based endeav-
our, largely comprising of constructing mathematical proofs.
This contrasts with work in the study of mathematical prac-
tice, which recognises that mathematics largely takes place
in a social context; that it involves “soft” aspects such as cre-
ativity, informal argument, error and analogy; and that math-
ematical knowledge comprises far more than mere proof, in-
cluding definitions, examples, conjectures explanations, and
so on.
Developments in the study of mathematical practice in-
clude work on visualisation, such as diagrammatic reasoning
in mathematics; analogies, such as between mathematical
theories and axiom sets; and mathematical concept devel-
opment, such as ways to determine potential fruitfulness of
rival definitions. Lakoff and colleagues (Lakoff and Núñez
2000) and Barton (Barton 2009) have explored the close
connection between language and thought, and shown that
images, metaphors and concept-blends used in ordinary lan-
guage shape mathematical (and all other types of) thinking.
At the heart of many of these analyses lies the question of
what proof is for, and the recognition that it plays multiple
roles; explaining, convincing, evaluating, aiding memory,
and so on, complementing or replacing traditional notions
of proof as a guarantee of truth). This in turn gives an al-
ternative picture of machines as members of a mathematical
community.
These developments present opportunities for researchers
in CC which would help to address the second barrier in
the “human-like” computing movement – that of difficulty
in automation.
Recommendation 1: CC researchers who have devel-
oped systems based on cognitive mechanisms, such as
concept-blending, analogies and metaphors (eg. (Veale
2012; Li et al. 2012; Baydin, Lopez De Mantaras, and
Ontanon 2012; O’Donoghue and Keane 2012)) may
consider applying these systems to mathematical do-
mains.
Recommendation 2: CC researchers who have expe-
rience in building and evaluating interactive systems
which enhance an expert user’s creativity (eg. (Bray
and Bown 2016; A. et al. 2014; Karimi et al. 2018))
may consider conducting their work with expert mathe-
maticians. This might, for instance, follow user-centred
design, development and testing, and perhaps bridge
work between AR and user mathematicians.
Automated Scientific Discovery
Brief history
Whereas AR traditionally has deduction at its heart, Auto-
mated Scientific Discovery (ASD) uses induction and ab-
duction to make new taxonomies, laws, theories, models,
predictions and explanations. Again, this endeavour started
early in the history of AI, with Herbert Simon’s work in 1966
on scientific discovery and problem solving (Simon 1966)
and DENDRAL, which used heuristic search to systemati-
cally evaluate all of the topologically distinct arrangements
of a set of atoms within the rules of chemistry (Lindsay et
al. 1993). The BACON set of programmes were also early
examples of ASD, which used rule-based induction to re-
discover empirical rules in history of physics and chemistry
(Langley 1979). The field became more active in the late
1970s and early 1980s, starting to use machine learning data,
and moved from replicating historical events to discovering
new ones, including results in astronomy, biology, chem-
istry, geology, graph theory, and metallurgy (see (Langley
2000) for a review). Today, widespread use of sophisticated
machine learning techniques, alongside an explosion of data
has led to discoveries such as metallic glass, cost-effective
plastic solar cells, and drug discovery.
The use of computational systems to find patterns in sci-
entific data is not without critics. For instance, Genevera
Allen highlighted accuracy and reproducibility issues with
scientific discoveries made by machine-learning techniques
in her recent talk at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).4
Key Challenge
Pat Langley – one of the most influential figures in ASD
– highlights the need for communicability of automatically
generated scientific knowledge. In (Langley 2002) he re-
views successful and unsuccessful ASD systems, conclud-
ing that scientists want interactive, mixed-initiative, rather
than fully automated systems. Results must be communi-
cated in language and notation which is familiar to the sci-
entist for collaboration to be successful. He also argues this
point in (Džeroski, Langley, and Todorovski 2007):
This emphasis on exchanging results makes it essential
that scientific knowledge be communicable. (Ibid. p2).
Opportunities for CC
The importance and value of narratives that explain, contex-
tualise, comment, and frame generated artefacts for public
or expert consumption has been recognised in CC (Charn-
ley, Pease, and Colton 2012), and in a human-only context is
known to affect perception of creativity in artistic domains.
The CC project to enable creative software to produce its
own framing information is in its infancy, but it forms a fun-
damental part of one of the main evaluation frameworks, as
the “F” part of the FACE model (Colton, Pease, and Charn-
ley 2011), and initial work has emerged. This approach goes
beyond the explainable AI movement (Došilović, Brčić, and
Hlupić 2018), as it aims to show motivation, aesthetic judge-
ments, and so on; telling the story behind the creation of an
artefact. We foresee this being an increasingly important
area of research in CC, with an increasing level of sophis-
tication: from explanation to justification to argument and
dialogue with a user about the value, method of production,
motivation etc. behind output. How framing information
should be developed is a research programme in its own
right. Whilst much attention has been focused on making
the outputs of ML systems more accurate and robust, there
4https://eurekalert.org/pub releases/2019-02/ru-
cwt021119.php
is also a need for framing information which is more ex-
planatory, more understandable to users and less prone to
misinterpretation.
Recommendation 3: CC researchers who are devel-
oping systems which can automatically produce fram-
ing information (eg. (Grace et al. 2017a; Tomašič,
Žnidaršič, and Papa 2014; Colton, Goodwin, and Veale
2012)), may consider applying them to ASD. This may
perhaps in collaboration with researchers and existing
systems in that field, with a focus on producing useful
framing information in a scientific context.
The Understandability Problem in Science and
Mathematics
The key challenges that we have identified in both AR and
ASD both concern understandability in science and mathe-
matics, and present two different approaches to the problem.
Our distinction by domain is, to a certain extent, artificial,
and our suggested approaches and recommendations could
be used in either domain. In this section we discuss more
generally the issue of understanding in science and mathe-
matics, and what that might mean in an AI world.
Understanding in human science and mathematics
Roger Newton’s quote above about the primary aim of phys-
ical scientists being to understand and explain nature is un-
controversial, but difficult to unpack. Ever since the entirety
of our collective scientific knowledge became too large for
a single polymath to comprehend, we have had to outsource
our understanding to others. The institutionalised ways in
which trust of others’ understanding and progress is handled
started with the early universities, and developed with the
invention of the printing press, academic journals, the peer
review process and so on. Knowledge and understanding
is a social process, as argued by (Martin and Pease 2013),
but even in the human-only case, this gets complicated. The
longest proof in history, of the Classification of Finite Sim-
ple Groups (CFSG), is over 10,000 pages, spread across 500
or so journal articles, by over 100 different authors, and took
110 years to complete. What does understanding mean here?
Perhaps a handful of people understand the proof in its en-
tirety, and when they die it is not obvious that any one person
will ever again understand the entire proof.
In the example of the CFSG, it is considered sufficient
that someone once understood the proof. However in the
ongoing case of the abc conjecture, this is not the case.
This conjecture – proposed in 1985, on relationships be-
tween prime numbers – is considered to be one of the most
important conjectures in number theory (more significant
than Fermat’s Last Theorem; in fact Fermat’s Last Theo-
rem would be a corollary of the proof). A proof would be
“one of the most astounding achievements of mathematics
of the twenty-first century.” (Goldfeld, in (Ball 2012)). In
2012 Shinichi Mochizuki – a mathematician with a good
track record, having proved “extremely deep” theorems in
the past (Conrad in (Ball 2012)) – produced a 500-page
proof. The problem is that the techniques and mathemat-
ical objects which Mochizuki has developed to use in his
proof are so new and strange that it would take a reviewer or
mathematical colleague most of their career to understand
them, before they were able to understand and verify the
proof. Despite some efforts from Mochizuki and a hand-
ful of his followers to make his work accessible, currently
his proof has neither been published nor accepted by main-
stream mathematicians, for the simple reason that they don’t
understand it.
Crowd-sourced mathematics, in which open conjectures
are solved collaboratively via online communities, has been
used for around ten years now by a subset of the mathe-
matical community as a new way of producing mathemat-
ics through collaboration and sharing (Gowers and Nielsen
2009). Neilsen argues that this has resulted in “amplifying
collective intelligence” in his book Reinventing Discovery
(Nielsen 2011). It has certainly resulted in some original
and significant new proofs (for instance, the proofs of the
Bounded Gaps Between Primes and the Bounded intervals
with many primes, in the 2014 Polymath8 project (eg. (Poly-
math 2014)). Here it is perfectly possible for a person to be
a co-author but not fully understand the proof in their own
paper.
Understanding in mixed-initiative science and
mathematics
Adding computers to the social process, to form a combi-
nation of people, computers, and mathematical archives to
create and apply mathematics – a “mathematics social ma-
chine” (Martin and Pease 2013) – further complicates mat-
ters. Take automated theorem proving; the task of deciding
whether a given formal statement follows from a given set
of premises (Sutcliffe and Suttner 2001). The least infor-
mative approach would be to produce merely a “yes”, “no”
or “unknown” response. Not only is this devoid of explana-
tion, but it also hides the effects of any bugs; requiring the
user to either trust the results, or verify the implementation.
This can be mitigated by having the system instead gener-
ate a proof object: a formal argument for why a given state-
ment follows or does not follow. Once generated, a proof ob-
ject’s validity can be checked without requiring any knowl-
edge of how it was created, thus avoiding the need to trust
or verify the (potentially complicated) search and genera-
tion procedures. Theorem provers which produce proof ob-
jects that are trivial to check by independent proof checker
programs (which are themselves easily verified, due to their
simplicity) satisfy the de Bruijn criterion (Barendregt and
Wiedijk 2005); examples are Coq (Barras et al. 1997) and
Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow, Paulson, and Wenzel 2002).
Proof objects are not a complete solution to understand-
ability, since they can still be quite inscrutable to human
users. This often depends on how closely the chosen for-
mal system is able to encode the user’s ideas: for example,
the formal proof of the Kepler Conjecture was performed
using a system of Higher Order Logic (HOL) (Hales et al.
2015) whose proof objects (natural-deduction style deriva-
tions), whilst tedious, are in principle understandable to a
user experienced with both the software and problem do-
main. The same cannot be said of the Boolean Pythagorean
Triples problem, a statement of Ramsey theory involving the
structure of the natural numbers. Rather than taking a high-
level approach like HOL, (2016) analysed sets {0 . . . n} for
larger and larger n, encoding these restricted versions of the
problem into the language of boolean satisfiability (SAT),
and found that the problem is unsatisfiable for n = 7825,
and hence for the natural numbers as a whole. In this case,
the proof object demonstrates this unsatisfiability using 200
terabytes of propositional logic clauses (compressable to 68
gigabytes). Not only is this far too much for any human
to comprehend, but the concepts used in the proof (boolean
formulae) are several layers removed from the actual prob-
lem statement (natural numbers, subsets and pythagorean
triples).
Whilst “low level” formalisms like SAT are less un-
derstandable or explanatory for users, they are far more
amenable to automation than more expressive logics. De-
spite the proof for the Boolean Pythagorean Triples prob-
lem being many orders of magnitude larger than that of
the Kepler Conjecture, the latter is well beyond the abil-
ity of today’s automated theorem provers due to its encod-
ing in HOL. Instead, it took 22 collaborators 9 years just
to formalise the proof (Hales had previously produced a
less formal proof, hundreds of pages long and accompanied
by unverified software; yet another reminder that human-
generated artefacts are not necessarily understandable ei-
ther).
Forgoing understandability
It may be the case that, given the increase in power, gen-
erality and predictiveness that ML approaches give, and the
increasing complexity and amount of scientific knowledge,
we decide to forgo understandability in science. As a com-
munity we would be in a unique position to develop thinking
on this, and to answer questions such as whether we should
try to replace understandability with something else. We
suggest identifying and engaging with stakeholder groups
in science and mathematics to ensure that we develop in di-
rections which will be fruitful and useful to society.
Another possible solution to the problems described here
would be to forego understandability in the current sense,
or rather to change our notion of what kind of thing we are
aiming to understand. For instance, could a neural network
itself be considered to be a scientific discovery, analogous to
the discovery of a new plant? It may be that AI systems be-
come objects of study in the same way as the human brain is
currently an object of study, with methods and approaches
from neural science, psychology, cognitive science and so
on employed to understand an AI system and its behaviour
and interactions. There is an interesting analogy between
ways in which we can “interrogate” a neural network, for
instance via generating inputs aligned to deep features (by
specifying a deep-level state, then “training” the input to get
close), and how we use introspection and analysis to under-
stand human learning. We’re gradually becoming cognitive
scientists and psychologists for the robots.5 This is already
5The term “robopsychologist” was coined by Isaac Asimov in
(Asimov 1950) to describe the study of the personalities and be-
havior of intelligent machines.
an active research area, with (Jonas and K.P. 2017) offering
a cautionary tale. Again, as a community we would be in a
position to provide a unique perspective on this, having re-
flected on what constitutes an artefact and how they might
be evaluated as novel or significant discoveries.
Concluding Remarks
Recent developments in other areas of AI – principally
machine learning (ML) – have led to astonishingly rapid
progress in generative processes. Research in Constructive
Machine Learning has led to impressive generative results in
both the arts and sciences, including painting, music, poetry,
gaming, drug design, and gene design – usually in collabora-
tion with domain experts. Our concern is that the sheer size
and combined resources of the ML community may render
generative work in CC untenable, potentially leading to an
identity crisis in the field.
CC has long been seen as more than “mere generation”.6
Celebrating and automating other aspects of creative acts in
addition to generation – such as making aesthetic judge-
ments, producing framing information (background infor-
mation about the work) and finding new meta-level pro-
cesses – is partly what distinguishes us from other AI fields.
As generative results in neighbouring areas of AI become
more sophisticated, we may wish to focus on these other as-
pects of the creative act. Extending our repertoire to include
more scientific domains will further strengthen our commu-
nal identity and enhance our value to other AI researchers
and to domain experts in science.
There is also the question of whether CC output might
run up against natural boundaries in some areas of the arts.
For instance, it is possible that in highly expressive domains,
such as poetry, computationally produced poems will not be
taken seriously, given the lack of authenticity of life experi-
ences they have. This was discussed in (Colton, Pease, and
Saunders 2018), in which the authors argue that a lack of
authenticity is a looming issue in CC. Authenticity is not so
inherently valuable in the sciences.
Furthermore, it may be the case that as the novelty
and backstory of computer-generated art wears off, society
questions whether we want more computer-produced paint-
ings or poems. The question as to whether we still want
more computer-generated science or mathematics, however,
seems less likely to be asked: we always want more science
and mathematics. We suggest this only hesitantly. At the
turn of the 20th century, photography caused an explosion
in the productivity of art. Flooding the market with images
forced artists to redefine their value and led to the creation of
modern art, transforming individual self-expression. Subar-
eas of photography have themselves developed as unique art
forms, such as wildlife photography and photojournalism.
Art has further been transformed through digital technology
by filters and editing. We can take inspiration from this: ad-
vances in AI can saturate old ways of thinking, but naturally
open up new ones. If high quality computationally produced
6The informal, tongue in cheek slogan at the 2012 ICCC con-
ference was “scoffing at mere generation for more than a decade.” -
although this has been challenged, for instance by (Ventura 2016).
art becomes common-place, art as we know it will be trans-
formed forever: a lot of concepts in art might collapse, but
at the same time new concepts which are currently unpre-
dictable might emerge. Of course, applying CC to science
may equally saturate certain fields or kinds of work. We
raise this here to begin a conversation on where CC in the
arts may eventually lead, and as a further potential concern
about focusing all our energy on the arts.
People are not naturally good at science. The history of
science and scientific methodology, the length of time it
takes to train a scientist and the high number of published
research findings in science which are considered to be false
or sub-standard7 all hint at the difficulty of the scientific en-
terprise. This is partially due to political and institutional
factors such as pressure to publish, conflicts of interest and
a culture which is often more competitive than collaborative;
but also partially due to the constant battle to avoid the large
number of cognitive biases that adversely affect our reason-
ing and judgements (Haselton, Nettle, and Andrews 2005;
Sutherland 2013). On the other hand, the arts – while also
difficult to do well – do not usually go against our natural
way of thinking, and can be seen as a celebration of our hu-
manity. In many ways science should be an obvious appli-
cation domain for computational creativity. This paper is a
call to arms for the whole CC community: to apply systems
based on cognitive mechanisms to scientific and mathemat-
ical domains; to employ experience in building and evalu-
ating interactive systems to this context; and to use exper-
tise in automatically producing framing functionality to en-
hance the communicability of automatically generated sci-
entific knowledge.
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